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will not be so disturbing to the status quo as a reading of the preamble may
lead one to believe. The same ground upon which this act may be held applica-
ble in the broad sense might well support later legislation-given an appropriate
change in the policy of the government-tending to control still further the
burden of strikes and boycotts on interstate commerce by materially limiting
the right to strike. (It is true that the prohibition of "compulsory arbitration"
legislation might still prove a partial obstacle to complete supervision of labor
relations and control of strikes.) It is not suggested that this act contains a
hidden menace to organized labor; it is merely suggested that such an act as
this need not inspire undue dread in the general public or in employers, nor
undue hope in the leaders of labor.
PROPOSED STATUTORY CHANGES IN MARRIAGE LAW
The difficulties surrounding an attempt to alter statute law are notorious.
Once a revision is accepted it may be impossible to procure further revision
for years. Consequently a new statute should be drafted with extreme care. In
failing to suggest any substantial departures from the existing law the draftsmen
of the proposed Illinois Marital Relations Bill, have failed to recognize that ex-
treme care requires not merely rejection of changes whose value has not been
demonstrated but also insistence upon changes where the existing law has
proved itself inadequate.
The purpose of this note is to demonstrate that a more extensive study of
the problems in the law of Marital Relations should be made before the Bill is
considered by the Legislature. It will be sufficient to examine only the more
striking inadequacies in the sections on Marriage.2 This is, of course, not in-
tended to imply that the other sections are error-free. The whole Bill must be
explored for desirable changes in policy and form alike. But no criticism of
public policy is here attempted; suggestions are made only where results gen-
erally considered desirable are missed or the language is so ambiguous that the
law remains uncertain.
Like all American marriage statutes, 3 the Bill sets up an intermediate age
class in which parental consent is required for a marriage.4 Although the Ian-
' Illinois House of Representatives Bill No. 919. In the Marriage and Divorce articles there
are no material changes from Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, cc. 89 and 4o, respectively.
2 Other parts are: Divorce; Uniform Marriage Evasion Law; Rights of Husband and Wife;
Relinquishment of Dower and Homestead of Insane Spouse; Power over Property upon
Absence or Imprisonment of Spouse; Relief to Destitute Wife or Children; Separate Main-
tenance.
3 1 Vernier, American Family Laws 188 (I93I).
4 "Sec. 3. Age. Male persons of the age of 21 years and older and female persons of the age
of 18 years and older may be joined in marriage. A male person who is a minor not less than 18
years old or a female person who is a minor not less than x6 years old may contract a legal
marriage if the parent or guardian of the minor appears before the county clerk in the county
where the minor resides, consents to the marriage, makes an affidavit stating that he is the
122
NOTES
guage leads almost irresistibly to the conclusion that marriages by parties in
this class without parental consent are not "legal," the courts are clear that
they are perfectly valid.s For this reason the provisions of the Bill will not pro-
tect boys and girls in the intermediate group from unfortunate alliances. These
provisions impose: (i) a duty on the license issuer to demand an affidavit of
the applicant, and a directory power to obtain witnesses and affidavits of third
parties;6 (2) a penalty for false affidavit;7 (3) a penalty for wrongful issuance of
license.8 The last of these is almost worthless not only because it apparently
does not apply to issuance to boys and girls in the intermediate class9 but be-
cause the issuance is not wrongful unless the issuer kzows of the defect and the
parent or guardian of the minor and stating that [si] the date and place of birth and place
of residence of the minor, and submits such proof of the minor's age as the county clerk
deems necessary to comply with the purposes of this Act." Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. x935,
c. 89, § 3. For collection of statutes see i Vernier, American Family Laws § 30 (1931). See
also Brockelbank, La Formation du mariage dans le droit des Etats-Unis 241 ff. (1935).
S Schwartz v. Schwartz, 236 Ill. App. 336 (1925); Buszin v. McKibbin, 254 Ill. App. 5ig
(1929). See i Vernier, American Family Laws 127 (1931); 22 L.R.A. (n.s.) 12o6 (igog). The
French Civil Code once made these marriages voidable, but that rule was abrogated in 1933.
Codes d'Audience, Code Civil, art. 148 (Dalloz, 1934). In the framing of the Uniform Marriage
Act there was an attempt to permit annulment by the parent, if the court thought it advisable
or by the child, but the proposal was defeated by a vote of 13 to 12, the Illinois delegate voting
in its favor. 23 Green Bag 549 (igr1). This is the provision in New York except that the court
must give its approval in actions by the child as well as by the parent. Cahill's N.Y. Cons. L.
1930, C. 14, § 7; Lazarczyk v. Lazarcayk, 122 Misc. 536, 203 N.Y.S. 291 (1924).
6 "Sec. 6 License ..... For the purpose of ascertaining the ages of the parties and the
legality of the contemplated marriage, the county clerk shall obtain the affidavit of the person
applying for the license, and may, if he deems proper, obtain the affidavit of the other party
to the contemplated marriage and of any other person or persons, or may examine either of
the parties or any other person under oath." Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, c. 89, § 6.
Meager though this provision may seem, it goes beyond the usual powers granted license
issuers. i Vernier, American Family Laws § 31 (1931).
"Sec. i4. Penalty for false affidavit. If a person wilfully and knowingly swears falsely as
to any material matter in an affidavit obtained by a county clerk before the issuance of a
marriage license or as to the age of either of the parties to the contemplated marriage, where
their age is material, and if the county clerk is thereby induced to issue a marriage license per-
mitting persons to be joined in marriage who are legally incapable or who have not the right
to be joined in marriage, such person shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year, or by both the fine and imprisonment." Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935,
c. 89, § 6.
8 "Sec. iS. Penalty for wrongful issuance of license. If a county clerk knowingly issues a
license for the marriage of persons who are legally incapable of contracting a marriage, he shall
upon conviction be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one
thousand dollars for each offense." Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, c. 89, § 15. There is
also a penalty for performing a marriage without a license. § 17; Smith-Hurd's fI1. Rev. Stats.
1935, c. 89, § 15. But this is unimportant in view of the obvious ease of acquiring a license.
9 They are not "legally incapable" of contracting marriage. This is a serious fault and
should be corrected.
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improbability of his having personal knowledge is exceeded only by that of its
being proved even if true. 0 The use of the word "knowingly" in the definition
of false affidavit is less serious," but experience has shown that perjury statutes
have little terror for those endeavoring to evade the marriage laws. 2
The fact-finding duties of the issuer deserve more extended comment. In-
creasing complication in the formalities preliminary to marriage has not been
without criticism,'3 but the case studies of Richmond and Hall and others have
convincingly portrayed the shocking consequences of child marriages,14 and the
purpose of the safeguards actually set up in the Bill is, presumably, to avoid
them. The additional burden to the average license-seeker is infinitesimal in
comparison.
In its present form the Bill imposes no serious obstacles to marriages between
boys and girls. Not only will the license issuer rarely see more than one party
(the elder, of course), but he may be satisfied with the mere affidavit of the
applicant; it is too much to expect that a busy clerk will demand more. 5 Al-
though the solemnizing officer may voice his objections, he is under no obliga-
tion to do so.,' If one clerk or officiant proves unyielding, the parties, educated
in the ways of perjury, promptly visit another.'7 Additional safeguards that
might well have been incorporated in the Bill are the requirements that both
parties apply for the license, 8 that documentary proof of age be supplied,9 that
10 This section originally applied to marriages of parties in the intermediate group and made
no express requirement of knowledge in the clerk. Ill. Rev. Stats. 1845, p. 354, § io. It was,
however, interpreted to require bad faith. Gilbert v. Bone, 79 Ill. 34' (1875).
- Witnesses will usually know whereof they speak. There is, however, the problem of "taxi-
driver-witnesses," especially prevalent in marriage mills. See Richmond and Hall, Marriage
and the State 56 ff (1929).
121d. at 3o5; ii Va. L. Reg. (n.s.) 113 (1925). The parties and the public prosecutor are
loath to prosecute and juries loath to convict.
13 "But as between the two systems of easy marriage and hard divorce and hard marriage
and easy divorce, we prefer the former." 33 Albany L.j. 181, 182 (1886). See also id. at 261.
But see id. at 319; 22 Cent. L.J. 265 (x886).
'4 Richmond and Hall, Child Marriages 58 ff., 95-102 (1925). See Municipal Court of Chi-
cago, Tenth and Eleventh Annual Report 113 (1915-1917); Hall, Child Marriages, 3 Encyc.
Soc. Sci. 398 (1930).
s The usual time required for issuance of a license is not more than ten or fifteen minutes,
and the clerk usually has many other duties. Richmond and Hall, Marriage and the State
42 ff (1929). At the Cook County office in Chicago the average time required is five minutes.
1
6In South Dakota the officiant must ascertain "to his satisfaction" the identity and age
of the parties and the names and addresses of witnesses. S.Dak.Comp.L. 1929, § 121. In
California he must satisfy any doubts he may have of the correctness of the statements in the
license and has the same inquisitorial powers as the issuer. Cal. Civ. Code 1931, § 72.
'7 This entails the loss of a fee. Some licensing officers make a habit of communicating the
names of rejected applicants to other issuers in the vicinity. It might be desirable to make
such a habit mandatory. See Richmond and Hall, Marriage and the State 63 (929).
z8 According to Richmond and Hall this is the practice in some offices even though not
required. Child Marriages 126 (1925).
'9 This could be limited to marriages in which there is some doubt that the parties are over
the age of consent. But such a rule might lead to carelessness on the part of the issuers. Today
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the license be issued only in the county where one of the parties resides.20 An
excellent statute in North Carolina provides that the issuer must make "reason-
able inquiry, '21 and this has been construed to require a considerable degree of
care.
22
The control furnished by the astuteness of the license issuer and the solem-
nizing officer, however, is necessarily a function of the desire on the part of these
persons to cooperate with the statute in avoiding undesirable marriages.23 Such
officers are in a position of importance and should be chosen with care. It should
not be impossible in the Bill to provide an administrative check upon the abuse
of their discretion.24 In any event the fee system should be abolished.25 As has
proof of age is a frequent requirement and is available from a variety of sources in addition to
the usual birth and baptismal certificates. School records, hospital records, vaccination certi-
ficates, confirmation certificates, and many others have strong probative force. Richmond and
Hall, Child Marriages X32 (1925). See Cahill's N.Y. Cons. L. 1930, c. 14, § IS.
20 Obviously not particularly helpful in a metropolitan community. Excellent otherwise.
Section 2 of the Uniform Marriage Law has this provision but carefully extracts its teeth by
permitting issuance in the county of celebration where both parties are non-resident. See
Freund, A Proposed Uniform Marriage Law, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 548, 552 (I9I1).
21 N.C. Code Ann. 1935, § 2503. Violation subjects the issuer to civil liability to the parent
or guardian, not to criminal prosecution. Some statutes require a "competent" or "disinter-
ested" witness. Wyo. Rev. Stats. 1931, 68-io6. This should be carefully enforced. See note
i i supra.
- "This is the rule upon which banks act in paying checks, and surely in the matter of such
grave importance as issuing a marriage license the register should not be excused upon a less
degree of care." Trolinger v. Boroughs, 133 N.C. 312, 317, 45 S.E. 662, 664 (1903). See also
Gray v. Lentz, 173 NC. 346, 91 S.E. 1024 (17).
'3 See comparison of license officers studied. Richmond and Hall, Marriage and the State
47 f (1929). Avarice and indolence are not the only causes for lack of care. Many issuers are
ignorant of the law. Many apparently consider the divorce courts a more efficient medium
for avoiding matrimonial ills.
24For instance, a statistical study giving the percentage of marriages where the ages given
were just over the age of consent would be useful in estimating the amount of age falsification.
A check-up might be made concerning the care taken by the issuers in exposing impediments.
Similar supervision is exercised by the state over charities and boards of health. See id. at
314-29.
25 For the issuance of a license a fee of three dollars is collected in Cook County and one
dollar in the rest of the state. Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, c. 53, §§ 35, 73. This is not
so serious, of course, in large offices where wage-paid assistants are the real issuers although
even here the profit motive will be effective in determining the policy of the office. The fees of
solemnizing officials are left to their own business judgment except justices of the peace, who
must charge two dollars. Id., § 59. According to Vernier all American jurisdictions impose
license fees, while only fourteen expressly provide for solemnization fees. i American Family
Laws 113 (1931). Notice that the fee system is objectionable only if the officer's remuneration
varies with the amount of fees collected. But where it does, the fee system almost inevitably
precludes care on the part of the officer. Its abolition would be the most important reform in
the marriage law.
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been suggested, an officer is under great pressure to stifle what scruples he may
have if a fee depends upon his complaisance and some other less scrupulous
officer will be only too happy to secure the job.26 This abolition is one step
toward the extinction of the much-deplored marriage mills2 from which Illinois
is not free. Another step is the licensing of marriage officiants or solemnizing
officials, who could then be compelled under pain of forfeiting the license, to
exercise reasonable discretion in consenting to marry parties apparently under
an impediment-intoxicated, very young, under coercion.21 Still another is the
requirement, already referred to, that the license be issued in the county of
residence of one of the parties.
29
It is generally agreed that a hasty or secret marriage is exceptionally liable to
prove unsuccessful. There is ordinarily no need for haste or secrecy if no diffi-
culties are likely to develop. In place of the ancient custom of "posting the
banns," made less valuable by the growth of metropolitan communities, several
states.have adopted an "advance notice" system.30 The reconsideration made
possible during this waiting period will, in many cases, enable the parties to
recognize the undesirability of the match. Furthermore, if the statute also pro-
vides for publication of the application or inquiries by the issuer, interested
third persons may be apprised of the project and take steps to prevent it by
informing the parties or the issuer of outstanding impediments.31 It might also
be wise to make some provision for third party objection in court as is provided
26With respect to fee-paid justices of the peace it was said: "The many upright and con-
scientious justices, whose characters are above reproach, are prevented from exerting even the
average amount of influence by the vicious system, which from its nature drives the business
into the courts of disreputable wretches who are willing to barter their judgment for a paltry
fee." Urdahl, The Fee System in the United States, 12 Trans. Wis. Acad. Sci., Arts, and Let.
49, 217 (i898). The advantages of the fee system-its tendency to urge officers toward
efficiency and amiability, its allocation of remuneration in proportion to work done-are in-
undated by this argument.
27 Richmond and Hall, Marriage and the State 84 ft. (1929).
28 According to Vernier eighteen American jurisdictions have this check in some form. z
American Family Laws 82 (I93I). See Ore. Code Ann. 1930, 33-104; Wis. Stats. 1933, 245.07.
29 See note 20 supra.
3" Seventeen (including Hawaii), according to Vernier. x American Family Laws 54 (1931).
See Mass. Ann. L. 1933, c. 207, § ig; Mich. Comp. L. 1929, § 12708. In a few the delay is be-
tween the issuance of the license and the ceremony, 'Making it possible for unscrupulous or
benevolent officiants to avoid the statute by post-dating the certificate. In most the license is
not issued until the end of the waiting period. In nearly all there is some provision for waiver
of the advance notice in emergencies. Mass. Ann. L. 1933, c. 207, § 30 (in the discretion of a
court or without a court when death of a party is-imminent) ;Mich. Comp. L. 1929, § 12708,
N.H. Pub. L. 1926, c, 286, § 24 (by court for "good cause"); Unif. Marr. and Marr. Lic. Act
§3 (191I).
3" Freund, A Proposed Uniform Marriage Law, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 548, 553 (1911).
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in the French Code.32 In fact it is not unthinkable to require the parties to get
court consent in all doubtful cases. 33
The preceding discussion is obviously not limited to the impediment of
nonage. Not only does the Bill set up three impediments to a valid marriage,34
but the courts freely recognise others,35 and there are hosts which, though not
affecting the legality of the marriage, may seriously jeopardize its success.
Where there is a defect in one of the parties which will make the marriage void,
voidable, or otherwise disastrous, it should be discovered before the wedding,
not after. Some states have made a requirement of a certificate of freedom
from venereal disease.36 Although the criticisms of this requirement are not in-
considerable,37 they are not overwhelming, and it serves at least as an example
of a desirable safeguard. Requirement of certificates of sanity and of freedom
from tuberculosis, epilepsy, and other transmissible or inheritable diseases are
not unknown.38 Proof of death of or divorce from former spouse of a party
32 Codes d'Audience, Code Civil, arts. 172-79 (Dalloz, 1934) (objection by spouse of one of
parties or certain relatives). This is in line with the former rule that marriages by minors with-
out parental consent are void. See note 4 supra. A few American states provide for third party
objection. i Vernier, American Family Laws 76 (193). See La. Civ. Code Ann. 1932, art. io6
(apparently any third person); Miss. Code Ann. 1930, § 2363 ("any interested party"); Unif.
Marr. and Marr. Lic. Act § 6 (1911) ("any person"). Great care should be taken to prevent
third party objection from becoming vexatious meddling on the part of disgruntled suitors as
it has become to a great extent in France.
33 This would eliminate the difficulty of accurate fact finding by a clerk, considered so great
by the Commissioners of Uniform Laws that they discarded provisions concerning insanity,
disease, etc. 35 A.B.A. Rep. i129 (igo9). The possibility of evasion by crossing state lines will
reduce the effectiveness of such a provision unless adjacent states adopt a similar rule.
34 Nonage (§ 3), consanguinity (Q 4) and insanity (§ 5). Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935,
c. 89, H9 3, 1, and 2 respectively.
3s Prior existing marriage, Crittenden v. Hindman, 271 Ill. 577, 111 N.E. 488 (i9x6). Want
of consent from imperfect understanding, Orchardson v. Cofield, 171 Ill. 14,49 N.E. 197 (0898)
(said to be a construction of the insanity clause). Intoxication, Barber v. People, 203 ll. 543,
68 N.E. 93 (1903) (dictumn). Duress, Short v. Short, 265 Ill. App. 133 (1932). Fraud, Lyon v.
Lyon, 230 Ill. 366, 372, 82. N.E. 85o, 852 (1907) (dictum). See L.R.A. i916C, 690 ff.
36 N.C. Code Ann. 1935, § 2500 (a) (male only); Ore. Code Ann. 1930, 33-118 (male only);
Wis. Stats. 1933, 245.10 (male only; provision for free tests). See Hall, Medical Certification
for Marriage 75-77 (X925).
37 If the fee for such a certificate is not so high as to be oppressive, it will not be sufficient to
support the apparatus required for an adequate test. It is feared that a class of shyster
physicians will arise furnishing certificates upon demand. See Peterson v. Widule, x57 Wis.
64r, 147 N.W. 966 (1914). For this reason this requirement was defeated in Michigan. 3
Mich. St. Bar J. *129 (1924). Instead one who has syphilis or gonorrhea is "incapable" 6f
contracting marriage and is guilty of a felony if he tries. Mich. Comp. L. 1929, § 12695. In
New Hampshire a physician must notify the board of health if he learns that a patient with a
venereal disease is about to marry. N.H. Pub. L. 1926, § I9.
38 N.Car. Code Ann. 1935, § 2500 '(a) (tuberculosis in infectious stage, adjudication of in-
sanity); N.Dak. Comp. L. 1913, § 4375 (epilepsy, insanity, tuberculosis in advanced stages,
venereal diseases in male, etc.). Since these defects are less dangerous than venereal diseases,
it might be desirable to require only those examinations which are comparatively simple.
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previously married could reasonably be demanded.39 To facilitate this proof
there should be a central register of all divorces granted or refused in the state.40
In spite of the most elaborate precautions, however, many undesirable
marriages will still be contracted and the courts will continue to annul some of
them. The Commissioners on Uniform Laws refused to provide rules for the
annulment of marriages because they had no hope of discovering generally
acceptable ones, 4' and it is not the purpose of this note to suggest substantive
policy. But the statute should cover the law of annulment and especially the
grounds upon which an annulment will be granted.42 The antiquated system
now administered by the courts is a product of history rather than practical
needs.43 Furthermore, the common law rules are not concerned with the tragic
consequences of an annulment. Modem statutes provide for the limitation of
attacks on marriages,44 for legitimacy and care of children,45 for the financial
protection of the putative wives, 46 for the exercise of discretion by the courts. 47
There is a variety of types of curative acts.45
39 Mass. Ann. L. 1933, c.207, § 21 (certificate of divorce); R.I. Gen. L. 1923, § 4164 (cer-
tificate of death or divorce).
40 Okla. Stats. 1931, § 4467; Va. Code 1930, § Sii6 a.
4' Freund, A Proposed Uniform Marriage Law, 24 Harv. L. Rev. 548 (191').
4 'Del. Rev. Code 1915, § 3004; § 2992 amended by Del. L. 1921, p. 578; N.Dak. Comp.
L. 1913, § 4368.
43See L.R.A. i916C, 69o. Where the impediment was "canonical," recognized only by the
ecclesiastical courts (consanguinity, etc.), the marriage was only voidable, but where the
impediment was "civil," recognized by the temporal courts (fraud, duress, etc.) the marriage
was void. A more rational rule would be this: Marriages are void where it is to the advantage
of society to override the wishes of the parties (consanguinity, bigamy, etc.), voidable where
it is expedient to permit the parties to decide their own fate (fraud, duress, etc.). Other good
systems might be devised, but the changes brought about by the courts have been confused
and incomplete.
44 Fourteen, according to Vernier. i American Family Laws 280 (193). See Cal. Civ.
Code 1931, § 83; N. Dak. Comp. L. 1913, § 4369.
4s Section 20 of the Bill makes legitimate the children of persons who "attempt to contract '
marriage. Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, c.89, § I7a. This wording is unfortunate because
it might not include a ceremony where one of the parties is coerced or one knows of the defect.
Better is, " .... issue of marriages declared null in law shall nevertheless be legitimate."
Mason's Minn. Stats. 1927, 8579. The German and Canon laws provide for legitimacy of
children of a void marriage only if one of the parties was bona fide. Ayrinhac, Marriage Legis-
lation in the New Code of the Canon Law 278 (1918); Germ. Civ. Code § 1699 (trans. and ann.
by Wang, 1907). But the German code qualifies this rule by a right in the child to demand
maintenance during his father's life as though legitimate, even though neither party was bona
fide. Id., § 1703.
46 Conn. Gen. Stats. 193o , § 5188 ("as in divorce"); N.J. Comp. Stats. 1910, p. 2035, § 25
(same section for divorce and annulment).
47 Popular pressure has forced lower courts to assume this power. For instance, since no one
will appeal, marriages by boys and girls in the intermediate category are constantly being
annulled with impunity.
48 See i Vernier, American Family Laws 8o (Ig3i). Most of these are vague and do little
more than destroy the value of the clause abolishing common law marriages. The statute
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Similar problems are raised by the abolition of common law marriages.49
This move was inspired not so much by censure of those participating as by a
desire to eliminate uncertainty.5' Yet American legislators have remained, for
the most part, unconcerned with the plight of women and children involved in
these unorthodox alliances.5' Awards for workmen's compensation and soldiers'
bonuses might be desirable in spite of lack of marriage lines,s2 if only to relax the
pressure on the relief rolls.
Moreover, even where there is a marriage there is frequently great difficulty
in proving its existence and validity s3 The courts have partially surmounted
this difficulty by presuming that an apparently matrimonial relationship is in-
deed licit and by putting the burden of proof on him who attacks it.S4 As an
aid to proof there should be central registration of all marriages in the state,ss
as well as the central registration of divorces previously suggested s6
should, however, expressly validate marriages entered into bona fide by the parties but cele-
brated by an officiant without authority. Unif. Marr. and Marr. Lic. Act § 24 ('gri). It
should also validate marriages void at inception because of an impediment which has later
been dissolved. See Mass. Ann. L. 1933, c. 207, § 6 (bigamous, at least one party bona fide).
49 Section 18; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, c. 89, § 4.
so See Richmond and Hall, Marriage and the State 293 (1929); Jacobs, 4 Encyc. Soc. Sci.
56 (I93I). These are not strong authorities for the proposition stated and there are many
declarations tending to the contrary. See quotations in Koegel, Common Law Marriage 167 ff.
(1922). It is difficult to support a contrary policy, however. The courts have gone to extra-
ordinary lengths to find common law marriages where possible. See Travers v. Reinhart, 205
U.S. 423 (i9o7); Johnson v. Dudley, 3 Ohio N.P. 196 (1896). And they have generally held
licensing statutes directory unless clearly mandatory language was used. Heymann v. Hey-
mann, 218 Ill. 636, 75 N.E. 1079 (1905); Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877); L.R.A. i915E,
113 ft.
51 But see Ore. Code Ann. 1930, 49-1817, I818 (illegitimate child, and unmarried woman
who has lived with unmarried employee for one year, entitled to workmen's compensation);
Cal. Gen. L. i93i, act 4749, § 14 (all those dependent in fact and members of household of
employee entitled to workmen's compensation).
52" .... We see no escape from the conclusion that this unfortunate appellant cannot be
awarded compensation from tie accident fund ....... Meton v. State Indust. Ins. Dep't,
2o4 Wash. 652, 6S8, 177 Pac. 696, 699 (1929). See 39 Yale L.J. 917 (1930).
53 If the officiant neglects to register the certificate, there is no record of the marriage. See
Richmond and Hall, Marriage and the State 295 (1929). The Bill partially avoids this danger
by fixing a penalty for not registering the certificate. § 17; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935,
c. 89, § i6. A duty should be put upon all issuers to follow-up a license not returned by in-
quiries of the parties or of the officiant, if known.
If third persons wish to prove marriage, they may be seriously handicapped by ignorance
of the exact county of celebration. There is similar difficulty in proving a prior divorce or
death of a prior spouse.
54 Potter v. Clapp, 203 Ill. 592, 68 N.E. 81 (19o3); Crysler v. Crysler, 330 I1. 74, i61 N.E.
97 (1928).
55 See Seventy-sixth Annual Report on the Vital Statistics of Massachusetts for the year
1917, Commonwealth of Mass., 1919, p. 47, quoted in Richmond and Hall, Marriage and the
State 294 (1929). Eleven purposes for such a registration are listed.
s 6 See note 40 supra.
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The sections on Marriage were selected for detailed discussion because their
problems are principally of form and expression rather than policy. The prob-
lems in Divorce and Husband and Wife, equally important, more frequently
involve conflict on fundamental social philosophy. But they should be reviewed
in somewhat the same manner. Examples of these problems leap to the tongue.
What shall be done to eradicate the migratory divorce, with respect both to
granting them and to recogizing those granted in foreign states and countries? 57
Would there not be a great improvement in the administration of family law
if the Domestic Relations court were given more extensive jurisdiction and
greater discretion? 5 The present grounds for divorce are neither adequately
planned as a matter of policy nor carefully enough drawn as a matter of form.59
With the rise of the view of unhappy marriages as a social wound and with
the decay of the guilt theory of divorce comes increasing need for revamping
the laws of marital relations. Product of an outworn social philosophy, they
are obsolete and inadequate.
s7 See Walton, International and Migratory Divorces, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 435 (1927); Beale,
Haddock Revisited, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1926); Goodrich, Matrimonial Domicile, 27 Yale
L.J. 49 (1917); 2 Vernier, American Family Laws § 89 (x932).
s8 See 5 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 197 (193I); Waite, Courts of Domestic Relations, 5 Minn. L. Rev.
16i (192X); Zunser, The Domestic Relations Court, 124 Ann. Amer. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. z14
(1926); Hoffman, Courts of Domestic Relations, 8. J. Crim. Law & Crim. 409 (i919).
s9 Sec. 58; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stats. 1935, c. 40, § I. See Brown, The Law and Pro-
cedure in Divorce, 13 Law Notes i28 (i909); Holbrook, Divorce Laws and the Increase of
Divorce, 8 Mich. L. Rev. 386 (igio); Herbert, Holy Deadlock (i934) (a bitter popular treat-
ment). Cf. Williams, Divorce Legislation Needed, 8 Va. L. Reg. 397 (1922).
